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Abstract
The idea of Gamwell on “religion as rational” was based on the 
concept that religious freedom is nothing other than a political 
discourse that can be figured out only through a democratic reso-
lution. Changing paradigm from “religion as non-rational” to “re-
ligion as rational” is a necessary condition for entering a public 
debate. Yet, the sole public debate or public view is not enough to 
solve the modern political problematic. The public debate must be 
guided by a constitutional procedure affirmed by the body politic 
so that it fulfills the criteria of formal claim about justice. Apply-
ing qualitative research and literature review this research tried 
to reveal: Gamwell’s idea of religious freedom, the features of the 
Islamic State as described by Abdul Rauf and Gamwell’s concept 
of religious freedom and the idea of establishing the Islamic State 
advocated by Abdul Rauf.
Gagasan Gamwell tentang “agama itu rasional” didasarkan pada 
konsep bahwa kebebasan beragama tidak lain adalah wacana poli-
tik yang hanya bisa diraih melalui resolusi demokratis. Mengubah 
paradigma dari “agama sebagai tidak rasional” menjadi “agama 
sebagai rasional” adalah syarat yang diperlukan sebelum mema-
suki debat publik. Namun, debat publik atau pandangan publik 
saja tidak cukup untuk memecahkan masalah politik modern. Per-
debatan publik harus dipandu oleh prosedur konstitusional yang 
ditegaskan oleh badan politik sehingga memenuhi kriteria klaim 
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formal tentang keadilan. Dengan menggunakan penelitian kuali-
tatif dan kajian pustaka penelitian ini mencoba mengungkapkan: 
gagasan Gamwell tentang kebebasan beragama, ciri-ciri Negara 
Islam seperti yang dijelaskan oleh Abdul Rauf, dan konsep Gam-
well tentang kebebasan beragama, serta gagasan untuk mendiri-
kan Negara Islam yang dianjurkan oleh Abdul Rauf.
Keywords:  Gamwell; religious freedom; Islamic state; democratic 
resolution.
Introduction
“There is no compulsion in religion; truly the right way has be-
come clearly distinct from error; therefore, whoever disbelieves 
in the Shaitan and believes in Allah he indeed has laid hold 
on the firmest handle, which shall not break off, and Allah is 
Hearing, Knowing” (al-Quran, al-Baqarah: 256).2
The explanation of this verse stated that religion (din) here 
signifies the belief about God embodied in the above ‘Verse of 
the Throne’ and the entire system of life which rests upon it. The 
verse means that the system of Islam, embracing belief, mor-
als and practical conduct cannot be imposed by compulsion. 
These are not things to which people can be yoked forcibly (Ab-
dul-Rahman 2009).
The Muslim thinkers seem to agree unanimously that the 
above verse clearly and decisively indicates that Islam offers re-
ligious freedom, so that every time they discuss the concept of 
religious freedom, they always refer to that verse. Ibn Kathir, one 
of those scholars interpreted the above verse that meant for “not 
to force anyone to become Muslim, for Islam is plain and clear, 
and its proofs and evidence are plain and clear. Therefore, there 
is no need to force anyone to embrace Islam. Rather, whoever 
Allah directs to Islam, opens his heart for it and enlightens his 
2 This translation is quoted from (Asad 1980, 57)
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mind, will embrace Islam with certainty. Whoever Allah blinds 
his heart and seals his hearing and sight, then he will not benefit 
from being forced to embrace Islam (Abdul-Rahman, 2009)
One of the several contemporary Muslim thinkers who has 
tried to describe the concept of religious freedom in Islam and 
refers to the above verse is Tan Sri Muhammad Abdul Rauf. 
In his book, The Concept of Islamic State: with Particular Ref-
erence to Treatment of Non-Muslim Citizens (1988) he elabo-
rates the features of the Islamic State and how it should treat 
the non-Muslim citizens. Apropos of the rights of the non-Mus-
lims, especially that related to religious freedom, I find it very 
convincing and fair. This was clearly described and analyzed by 
Akram D. al-Umari in his article, Medinan Society at the Time of 
the Prophet (1991), in which stated how Muslims treated well 
the non-Muslim citizens. 
 However, no matter how just the treatment of the Islamic 
State in dealing with the non-Muslims would be, it raises at least 
two fundamental questions: what is the meaning of religious 
freedom? and, can the concept of religious freedom be defined 
only by one side, namely by the Muslims?I believe that the con-
cept of religious freedom can only make sense in so far as it is 
defined or formulated by both sides, by the Muslims and the 
non-Muslims (Audi and Wolterstorff 1997).  If Islam legitimates 
the plurality of religions as the above verse claims, logically the 
Islamic State should let the legitimate religious convictions de-
fine their own religious freedom.
In view of this, I would like to discuss whether the claim of 
religious freedom and the idea of establishing an Islamic State 
proposed by Abdul Rauf is a coherent political principle or not. 
In discussing his ideas, I would like to use the concept of reli-
gious freedom advocated by Franklin I. Gamwell in his work, 
The Meaning of Religious Freedom, Modern Politics and the 
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Democratic Resolution (1995). This is based on the reason that, 
as far as I am concerned, this work offers a coherent resolution 
for figuring out the modern political problems related to reli-
gious freedom. 
The discussion will be divided into three parts. The first part 
is that related to the Gamwell’s idea of religious freedom. This 
will be used as the theoretical basis for analyzing the idea of 
establishing the Islamic State as proposed by Abdul Rauf. The 
second part will reiterate the features of the Islamic State as de-
scribed by Abdul Rauf. The last part will discuss the application 
of Gamwell’s concept of religious freedom and the idea of estab-
lishing the Islamic State advocated by Abdul Rauf.
The Meaning of Religious Freedom
Religious freedom and religious liberty are often used inter-
changeably. Both of them have a synonymous meaning, express-
ing the absence of coercion of someone mind in expressing his or 
her belief or conscience. Yet in the context of political and legal 
rights, the term “religious freedom” is more often used than the 
term “religious liberty” (Koshy 1992, 23; Attabani 1995).
Carilo de Albornoz, as quoted by Koshy, suggests that reli-
gious liberty or religious freedom has four main aspects, namely; 
liberty of conscience, liberty of religious expression, liberty of 
religious association and, the last, corporate and institutional 
religious freedom. Among these four aspects, freedom of con-
science is the most genuine and an absolute right in the sense 
that inalienability transcends the other three aspects. Since the 
freedom of conscience is an absolute right, religious freedom 
should encompass freedom to choose or not to choose a certain 
religion. Personal truth must be regarded as the supreme value. 
It entails self-commitment and self-responsibility. It transgresses 
the commitment to other agents such as government and even 
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god (Koshy 1992, 22). It is in this sense that Gamwell defines 
religion and only in this sense should the meaning of “authentic 
human being” be defined. Thus, in broader terms, religion is de-
fined as a self commitment to personal truth since it is the foun-
dation to determine the authenticity of a human being (Gamwell 
1995, 30–31).3
The freedom of conscience constitutes the inner dimension, 
while the expression or the manifestation of the conscience, ei-
ther manifested personally or institutionally, constitutes the ex-
ternal dimension of religious freedom (Koshy 1992, 24). The 
division of religious freedom into the internal and the external 
dimensions finally leads to an idea that the later is not absolute 
in nature. This means that the right to manifest the religious 
conscience is dependent on the other agents such as government 
and other elements of body politics. Even though for example, 
one’s personal truth or personal conscience says that committing 
suicide is a noble act, he cannot manifest it freely by simply say-
ing “this is my right”. The manifestation of religious conscience 
is subject to public debate, discussion and assessment from the 
other agents. Thus, religious conscience or religious conviction 
is subject to public debate when it is manifested in a political 
arena. It is in this context that the idea of religious freedom is 
closely linked with politics. 
According to Franklin I. Gamwell, the assessment of reli-
gious freedom in relation to politics can be described in two 
ways; religion as rational and religion as non-rational. The the-
sis of religion as rational suggests that every religious conviction 
is allowed to enter into a political arena. In a democratic dis-
3 In the other parts of hisbook, Gamwell criticizes the idea of Sidney E. 
Mead because of his inclusive definition of religion. Mead defines religionon-
ly that belongs to theistic religion. According to Gamwell, this is not sensible 
since this will eliminateother people’s right to express his or her self-authen-
ticity, see Gamwell (1995, 147).
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course, no one is allowed to proscribe other people to express 
their self-authenticity which is found in their religious conviction. 
But, as a consequence, the religious conviction must be ready to 
be debated and assessed publicly. This is why, he criticizes the 
political approaches which are based on the thesis of religion as 
non-rational like that developed by John Rawls, the approach 
of the partisans promoted by John C. Murray and the approach 
of the pluralist from Kent Greenawalt (1988).4 Gamwell is quite 
sure that the assessment of religion as non-rational will only end 
up with non-coherent resolution and will only produce non-co-
herent political principles. In brief, the assessment of religion as 
non-rational will not be able to solve what Gamwellcalls “the 
modern political problematic.” 
The modern political problematic refers to a condition in 
which religious authority loses its domination over the state 
and, at the same time, there is an increasing freedom to choose 
a given religious conviction within the political community. The 
erosion of the religious authority finally leads to the state to 
a legitimate plurality of religious convictions. The state can no 
more prescribe politically to limit the emergence of religious 
convictions. Thus, the modern political problems are character-
ized by an indeterminate number of religious convictions. The 
limitation of the number of religions can possibly be done only 
by force (Gamwell 1995, 5–10).
However, the limitation by force is not a good resolution 
since it does not run parallel with the idea of democracy. The 
democratic resolution to the modern political problems can 
work out only by letting the political community exercise their 
activities which is constituted or represented by their self-under-
standing. The self-understanding is, however, the choice of their 
4 To know how Gamwell criticizes the approaches which are based on 
the thesis of religion as non-rational, seeGamwell (1995, 47–115).
R E L I G I O U S  F R E E D O M  A N D  T H E  I D E A  . . .
Walisongo: Jurnal Penelitian Sosial Keagamaan 69
purpose for the sake of searching and determining their self-au-
thenticity as a human being (Gamwell 1995, 17). 
Even though our activities choose and decide our purpose 
with understanding, “it does not mean that our understanding is 
always explicit (Gamwell 1995, 17).” This means that our pur-
pose is not always chosen by our activities through a conscious 
thought. Since our activity is not always conscious and under-
stands explicitly of all things completely, our activity also in-
cludes or is represented by“implicit understanding”, that is the 
understanding which is excluded from conscious thought but 
it is so decisive that our explicit understanding dependent on it 
and without it our explicit understanding “could not be what it 
is” (Gamwell 1995, 17, 217).
Distinguishing the implicit understanding from the explicit 
understanding is important in order to know the formal dis-
tinction between religious and political activity.Since both reli-
gious and political activities are forms of human activities, both 
can only be differentiated from their explicit understanding, not 
from their implicit understanding (Gamwell 1995, 19). For ex-
ample, a state stipulates the marital law which is based on the 
principle of monogamy. This activity is, of course, directed to an-
swer explicitly the question about the state’s policy, and hence, 
it is a political activity. But implicitly, it is religious activity since 
it implies that the state supports and implements the Christian 
understanding of the principle of marriage.
Because an understanding provides an answer to a given 
question, human activities are also distinguished by the ques-
tion which is explicitly asked. Thus, religious activities are 
distinguished from political activities because of the question 
which is explicitly asked. On this account, Gamwell defines re-
ligion as “the primary form of culture in terms of which the 
comprehensive question is explicitly asked and answered. The 
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term “form of culture” here means that a religion is “a set or 
system of concepts and symbols in terms of which human ex-
plicitly understand themselves” (Gamwell 1995, 23) while, the 
term “primary” indicates that there is also the secondary form 
of cultures such as theology, philosophy, and philosophical the-
ology. If the “primary form” asks and answers to the compre-
hensive question explicitly and decisively, the “secondary form” 
asks and answers to the comprehensive question critically. Thus, 
theology and philosophy are forms of religious activity in order 
that the religious activity becomes self-critical (Gamwell 1995, 
29).  Meanwhile, the term “comprehensive” in the above defini-
tion refers to the purpose of life (Gamwell 1995, 18). Thus, the 
question about the religious activity might be formulated: what 
should the activities of the religion be or what should a religion 
do to fulfill the purpose of life? 
If the religion asks and answers explicitly to the comprehen-
sive question, the politics asks and answers explicitly to the ques-
tion about the state. This is because the politics is only a form of 
association, not a form of culture. Hence, a political activity is 
not directed to ask and answer explicitly to the comprehensive 
question, but it is limited only to ask and answer explicitly to the 
question of the state. Therefore, the question about the political 
activity might be formulated: “what should the activities of the 
state be and what should the state do?” (Gamwell 1995, 32).
Based on the above explanation it is clear that our activity 
is constituted by both explicit and implicit self-understanding. 
If our activity is intended to understand the purpose of life, it is 
constituted by our “comprehensive self-understanding (Gamwell 
1995, 18).” That is why, the question about the purpose of life 
should also be constituted by“comprehensive question”, and it 
is the answer to the comprehensive question that the authentici-
ty of a human being can be found(Gamwell 1995, 35–36). Since 
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it is a religion that provides the comprehensive understanding 
and provides the answer to the comprehensive question, it is not 
wise to discard religion from the political arena. But, as a con-
sequence, the religious conviction has to be ready to enter into a 
free and full public debate. 
The above statements indicate that, for Gamwell, the re-
ligious conviction must be constituted in the political expres-
sion. But, before it becomes the state’s policy, it must be tested 
through the public debate or public view. This public view is 
important for the sake of determining the validity of a given re-
ligious conviction. In view of this human experience and reason 
is, of course, very significant to see whether that religious con-
viction is valid or not (Gamwell 1995, 190). This idea is in line 
to what Mayer discussed related to the Islam and Human Rights 
Tradition and Politics (Mayer 1994, 173–76) in which she offers 
the concept of“Islamic human rights schemes” in the scheme of 
political way. These are the attempts done by conservative reli-
gious scholars and intellectuals to produce an Islamic version 
of human rights law–typically in the form of an Islamic “bill 
of rights”. The schemes resulted sometimes replicate provisions 
found in documents like the 1948 Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights. More often, however, they modify these provisions 
in accordance with Islamic criteria or introduce some alternative 
sets of rights which are not found in the contemporary interna-
tional law. Mayer also offers to set up any discussion related to 
Islamic human rights. 
The full and free debate is only possible to be done if we 
change our perspectives from the thesis of religion as non-ra-
tional to the thesis of religion as rational. This is the first and 
foremost step to be taken into consideration when we would 
like to follow Gamwell’s ideas in overcoming the political prob-
lems related to religious freedom. It is a necessary condition for 
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the following step proposed by him, namely “democratic res-
olution.” Thus, before we come to a political arena, our mind 
should agree upon the idea that religious conviction is subject to 
public debate and discussion. 
The democratic resolution of religious freedom entails a 
democratic constitution. The democratic constitution should en-
compass and answer both politically and religiously formulated 
problems. The formulation of the political problem will ask: is 
a given constitution consistent with the plurality of legitimate 
religions? In contrast, the formulation of the religious problem 
will ask: can a given constitution be affirmed by adherents of 
a plurality of religion (Gamwell 1995, 161). These two prob-
lematic formulations are of great significance for determining 
whether the public view or public debate can work out or not. A 
given constitution that does not encompass the answer to these 
two problematic formulations is not the democratic constitu-
tion, and hence, one without religious freedom.
The democratic constitution must also identify the partici-
pants in the discussion or debate and their rights in order that 
the discussion could be fully free. The procedure for making 
decisions, the procedure for executing decisions, the procedure 
for enforcing the prescription of the constitution, the procedure 
for adjudicating differences in relation to both decisions and the 
constitutional prescriptions must b included in the constitution. 
In order to be a fully free-debate, the constitution itself must be 
subject to continual assessment. Thus, the procedure for chang-
ing or amending the constitution must be explicitly stated in the 
constitution (Gamwell 1995, 163). In brief, the democratic con-
stitution should reflect the affirmation of all religious adherents. 
That is why the constitution that explicitly describes a certain 
comprehensive understanding is not a democratic constitution. 
The democratic constitution must be neutral from any explicit 
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claim of any comprehensive understanding. 
The democratic decision produced by the democratic con-
stitution might not be in line with other comprehensive under-
standings or does not satisfy the other religious adherents. But 
insofar as the procedure reflects justice, in the sense that that 
procedure has been stipulated trough agreement before the de-
cision emerges, there is no reason for the other adherents of re-
ligion not to obey that decision. In other words, they might be 
in disagreement with that decision, but they have to obey and 
respect it as long as it is stipulated through an agreed procedure. 
The inconsistency to the democratic procedure means inconsis-
tency to the overriding commitment and inconsistency to the 
idea of religious freedom itself (Gamwell 1995, 164–67).
The feeling or the stance that a given constitution is just 
might change from time to time. A given religious adherent 
might feel that the decision making procedure written explicitly 
in the constitution is just and, therefore, they are bound to a 
commitment to it. But, later, after undertaking a series of de-
bates, they find the decision-making procedure unjust. As a re-
sult, they want to change their previous commitment. It is very 
relevant to mention the research result of Charles M. North and 
Carl R. Gwin (2004, 103–17) that was done in 59 countries 
and revealed that the establishment of state religion and consti-
tutional protection of religion had a very significant opposing 
effect. The existence of a state religion reduces attendance of 
religious practices, whereas each decade of constitutional pro-
tection increase attendance of religious practice significantly. It 
was also found that other measures of religious regulation have 
a negative effect on attendance. Besides that, it was found also 
that ironically the motive behind the establishment of a partic-
ular state religion is to strengthen that religion, but the effects 
are ultimately undermine the vitality of the established religion.
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The democratic discourse, however, does not regard changing 
commitment as an aberration of the commitment itself. Chang-
ing commitment to the overriding decisions is justifiable. Those 
who disagree must have a room in the constitution in order to 
persuade the body politic, say the other religious adherents, that 
a certain decision-making procedure written in the constitution 
must be changed.While they have the opportunity to persuade 
the other religious adherents to change their commitment to the 
overriding decisions, at the same time they have to respect and 
comply with the decisions produced through that decision-mak-
ing procedure with which they now disagree (Gamwell 1995, 
167).
With the above description, Gamwell stresses a distinction 
between formal and material claims about justice. The formal 
justice is a justice which is reflected by and manifested in the 
constitutional procedure that overrides the other decisions. As 
long as that overriding constitutional procedure is affirmed by 
the body politics, there has been the claim about justice. Thus, 
the affirmation of the body politic to the overriding constitu-
tional procedure is a decisive factor to determine that the formal 
claim about justice has been fulfilled. While the material justice 
is a justice which is manifested in the decisions which are pro-
duced through the constitutional procedure.
In the democratic discourse, what has been at stake is the 
formal claim about justice. The material claim about justice 
might be different from one to another adherent of various re-
ligious convictions. But, as long as the formal claim about jus-
tice manifested in the procedure of making, executing, enforcing 
and changing decisions is affirmed by the adherents of all reli-
gious convictions the democratic discourse can work out (Gam-
well 1995). Thus, even though the material claim about justice 
manifested in, for instance, a given ordinance cannot satisfy the 
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whole body politic, all must obey that ordinance since it is stip-
ulated through the overriding constitutional procedure that has 
fulfilled the criteria of the formal claim of justice. This is what 
has made Gamwell quite sure that the democratic resolution is 
the only way to solve the modern political problems related to 
religious freedom. The full and free debate is a coherent consti-
tutional principle which is able to unite a political community 
through a formal claim about justice (Gamwell 1995, 183).
Although the democratic constitution emphasizes the im-
portance of the procedural justice or formal claim about justice, 
this does not mean that the material justice can be neglected. 
The material claim about justice manifested in a given ordinance 
must also be tested. In other words, the comprehensive under-
standing or the religious conviction that now becomes an or-
dinance must be validated by appealing to human experience 
and reason (Gamwell 1995, 190). For instance, the body politic 
stipulates an ordinance allowing the practice of slavery. The or-
dinance is, finally, stipulated through voting after having been 
debated freely and in accord with the affirmed constitutional 
procedure or procedural justice. Although this ordinance is stip-
ulated through the procedural justice, it is not in line with the 
idea of democratic discourse since human reason and experience 
says that practicing slavery is inhuman. Thus, a religious convic-
tion which is represented in the ordinance contradicts the idea of 
religious freedom. This ordinance implicitly indicates that there 
is no religious freedom. 
From the above explanation, it is clear that the democratic 
resolution entails the involvement of various legitimate compre-
hensive understandings or various religious convictions to the 
play in a political arena. As a result, the democratic resolution of 
religious freedom as proposed by Gamwell can work out only if 
we change our paradigm from the thesis of “religion as non-ra-
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tional” to the thesis of “religion as rational”. The term “religion 
as rational” here means that every religious conviction must be 
ready to be freely and fully debated.
Changing paradigm from the thesis of religion as non-ra-
tional to religion as rational is a very significant precondition 
without which there would be no democratic discourse. Howev-
er, the only public view or public debate is not enough to settle 
the modern political problems related to religious freedom. The 
public debate must be guided by a democratic constitution in or-
der that the public debate could produce a democratic decision.
The democratic constitution must fulfill the criteria of the 
formal claim about justice, that is a constitutional procedure 
that has had the affirmation of the body politic. So important 
is the affirmed constitutional procedure that there would be no 
democratic discourse without it. Yet, the sole just constitutional 
procedure is not enough unless the decisions produced through 
that constitutional procedure also fulfill the criteria of the mate-
rial claim about justice.
The Features of the Islamic State
The following discussion will describe the features of the 
Islamic State as proposed by Abdul Rauf in his book The Con-
cept of Islamic State; with Particular Reference to Treatment of 
Non-Muslim Citizens (1988). Since his description is not wholly 
related to the concept of religious freedom advocated by Frank-
lin I. Gamwell, I will discuss only four features: sovereignty, shu-
ra or the consultative body, human equality and adherence to 
sharia or Islamic law. 
Abdul Rauf believes that in the Islamic State, the loyalty and 
sovereignty belong to Allah. He criticizes modern political ideas, 
stating that in them, loyalty should be addressed to territorial 
entity and sovereignty is in the hand of the people. This is differ-
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ent from the Islamic State where the House of Representatives 
does not have an absolute and independent power, in the sense 
that it must always seek the revealed guidance, namely the Qu-
ran and the Prophetic Tradition (Abdul Rauf 1988, 22).
Under the Islamic political system, the rulers should rule 
on behalf of Allah. This resembles what has been done by the 
Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him). The main duty of the 
rulers is executing what Allah has commanded. If there is a gap 
between the rulers and the House of Representatives, all have to 
seek the guidance from the sharia (Abdul Rauf 1988, 22).
Since the loyalty and sovereignty belong to Allah, there is 
no room for nationality in Islam. Nationalism is justifiable only 
insofar as it is intended to mobilize the people to resist foreign 
domination (Abdul Rauf 1988, 22). 
The second feature of the Islamic State which is closely re-
lated to the idea of religious freedom is that about Shura or 
the Consultative body. The Shura institution had long been the 
practice of the Muslim rulers from the time of the Prophet to 
the time of Ali, the fourth successor of the Prophet. The Shura 
terminated when the political system changed from Caliphate to 
dynasty system (Abdul Rauf 1988, 25–29).
Even though the practice of mutual consultation in the early 
periods of Islam was conducted in a simple and natural way, 
this concept has laid down a good foundation for the sake of 
creating parliamentary as well as check and balance system as 
practiced in the modern political system. In the decision-making 
process, the first step to be done is mutual consultation. But if 
the member of Uli al-Amri (People Assembly) are in disagree-
ment, the opinion of the majority should be binding even though 
this opinion might not in line with the wisdom of the chief ex-
ecutive. Yet, to some extent, the chief executive still has the right 
to veto (Abdul Rauf 1988, 30–31).
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The third feature of the Islamic State which is closely related 
to the concept of religious freedom is the commitment to sharia. 
In its broader sense, sharia means the total guidance derived 
from the Quran and from the model of the Prophet Muham-
mad. On this account, the sharia covers regulation of all aspects 
of a human being either it is formulated in Islamic Theology, 
Islamic Ethics, Islamic Law or the other branches of Islamic sci-
ence. However, in its narrow sense, sharia is always identified 
with Islamic Law (Abdul Rauf 1988, 38).
The fourth feature of the Islamic State is that related to the 
concept of equality of human being. The Islamic State respects 
the principle of human equality for all citizens. Both Muslim 
and non-Muslim have an equal blood price. This is why, as the 
Quran stipulates, if a Muslim kills a non-Muslim, the Muslim 
is liable to the death penalty. In brief, in the Islamic State, no 
class or group of society has the right to special treatment. All of 
the society “enjoy the equal right and equal opportunity (Abdul 
Rauf 1988, 36–37).”
In legal cases, criminal and civil cases, all citizens, regardless 
of their religious background, have to be treated equally. The 
blood and the wealth of the non-Muslim must be protected the 
same as the blood and the wealth of the Muslim citizen. The 
non-Muslims have the right to take part in the state services, 
such as health, education, and economy (Abdul Rauf 1988, 57–
59). In other words, like the Muslim citizen, the non-Muslim 
citizen has to be trusted to hold public offices and to serve in 
the military as long as they are qualified. The non-Muslim citi-
zen must not suffer from any discrimination, except holding the 
position with religious nature, such as the Mufti (jurist consult) 
and the Imam or the leader of a religious congregation (Abdul 
Rauf 1988, 55; Rahman 1985; Sisk 1992).
In the Islamic State the non-Muslims have the right to per-
R E L I G I O U S  F R E E D O M  A N D  T H E  I D E A  . . .
Walisongo: Jurnal Penelitian Sosial Keagamaan 79
form or to practice their religious convictions as long as doing 
so does not cause serious harm to others in the community. They 
are not obliged to observe the prohibitions which are peculiar to 
Muslim, such as consuming fork and wine insofar as this does 
not invite serious harm to public security. However, the practice 
of usury, even if the non-Muslim believes it to be lawful, must 
be forbidden since this practice can elicit a bad influence on the 
whole society and on the economic condition in general (Abdul 
Rauf 1988, 50–51).
Religious Freedom and Islamic State: Gamwellian Approach
In the previous section, I have reiterated the features of the 
Islamic State proposed by Abdul Rauf. I choose only four out of 
six features promoted by him since the other two features can be 
explicitly included in those four features. The features of politi-
cal authority and the principle of justice can be included in the 
features of sovereignty and human equality.
Actually, the term “Islamic State” itself indicates that the 
state explicitly supports Islam as the answer to the comprehen-
sive question. According to Gamwell, this explicit support is, 
of course, not justifiable since it will eliminate the free and full 
public debate or public view (Gamwell 1995, 167, 186). That is 
why, as long as a state mentions the word “Islamic” explicitly, 
like the Islamic Republic of Pakistan or The Islamic Republic of 
Iran, the free and full debate as proposed by Gamwell cannot 
work out. Consequently, it is impossible to manifest the demo-
cratic discourse. 
Stating the word “Islamic” in the constitution, however, will 
have a great impact on other decisions. A constitution is a pro-
cedure that overrides the other decisions. In the democratic dis-
course, it is not justifiable to eliminate the rights of the other 
adherents of different religious convictions to take part in the 
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public debate. The explicit statement of the Word “Islamic” in 
the constitution, however, will eliminate the rights of the other 
religious adherents to express their religious convictions. This 
is, of course, not in line with the democratic discourse because 
eliminating the right to express a given religious conviction 
means eliminating the right to express self-authenticity. In view 
of this, a question emerges, can a state be named “Islamic State” 
without mentioning it explicitly in its constitution? If the answer 
is “no,” it means that, according to Gamwellian approach, there 
is no religious freedom. 
A similar question can be posed in relation to the concept 
of sovereignty. Can an Islamic State put an article in its consti-
tution stating that the sovereignty shall be in the hand of the 
people? An explicit statement about “Allah’s Sovereignty” in the 
constitution, however, will blur our vision in distinguishing the 
meaning of political activity and religious activity. Both become 
indistinct. As stated in section two, political activity is addressed 
to ask and answer explicitly to the question of the state, while 
religious activity is directed to ask and answer explicitly to the 
comprehensive question. Thus, if the words “Allah’s sovereign-
ty” is written explicitly in a constitution, that constitution no 
more reflects a political activity. In order for the constitution 
to reflect the political activity, that constitution must explicitly 
state that the sovereignty shall be in the hand of the people. Also, 
the explicit statement about “Allah’s Sovereignty” means that 
the state affirms and endorse explicitly a given comprehensive 
conviction, namely the conviction of the people who believe in 
Allah. 
In the democratic discourse, the state cannot explicitly sup-
port any answer to the comprehensive question. But this does 
not mean that the state eliminates the role of religion in political 
life. In the democratic discourse, the religious essential to the 
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body politic in the sense that every political decision should im-
plicitly represent a valid comprehensive conviction.Whatis not 
in line with the democratic discourse is the “explicit” endorse-
ment of the state to a given comprehensive conviction (Gamwell 
1995, 205). This is why, as far as the words “Islamic” and “Al-
lah’s Sovereignty” is explicitly stated in the constitution there 
would be no religious freedom.
Suppose the articles which explicitly stated, “Allah’s sov-
ereignty” and “Islamic State” in the constitution is the amend-
ments produced through an overriding constitutional decision. 
The question here is, what kind of overriding constitutional de-
cision or procedure can be used as a reference to produce these 
amendments?
A democratic constitution, however, must eliminate any ex-
plicit supporter explicit affirmation to any comprehensive con-
viction (Gamwell 1995, 167, 186). Thus the overriding consti-
tutional procedure is possibly formulated: “the state shall not 
explicitly support or affirm any religious conviction.” If this is 
the overriding constitutional procedure, then, how can these 
amendments be produced? If the above overriding constitution-
al procedure is affirmed by the body politic, while at the same 
time there are some decisions, say articles, about “Allah’s sover-
eignty” and “Islamic State” in the constitution, the constitution 
must be self-contradictory. 
The other features of the Islamic State that need further dis-
cussion are those related to the concept of Shura (Consultative 
Body) and human equality. As far as I know, Abdul Rauf does 
not elaborate the criteria for the membership of the Shura. Who 
can be the member of the Shura and how decision-making pro-
cess should be done are not explained. 
According to the democratic discourse, the member of the 
Consultative Body must not be limited only to one or some ad-
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herent of religious conviction. This is the logical consequence 
of the idea that every citizen is free to express his or her own 
religious conviction which is believed to provide his or her au-
thenticity as a human being. That is why there is no reason not 
to accommodate their aspiration in the Consultative Body. 
The way in which their aspiration is accommodated could 
be deferent from one to another country. In a more populated 
country, one member of the Consultative Body might represent 
many more constituents than he or she might do in a less popu-
lated country. This procedure must be clear and must be stated 
explicitly in the constitution and must get the affirmation of the 
body politic. This constitutional procedure must give a room for 
the whole adherents of different religious convictions. The ques-
tion of whether a given religious adherent can utilize that room 
or not is another thing. The most important thing is that the 
constitution must fulfill the requirement of what Gamwell call 
“formal claim about justice,” in the sense that the whole body 
politic, regardless of their different religious convictions, must 
affirm the constitutional procedure that overrides any decision 
(Gamwell 1995, 175). 
With the above explanation, I would argue that there would 
not be religious freedom in a country whose Consultative Body 
member is limited only to the adherents of a given religious 
conviction. Now, the question is, can an Islamic State provide a 
constitutional procedure that includes the whole body politic to 
have the same rights and opportunity to sit in the Shura (Con-
sultative Body)? If the answer is “no,” it means that there is no 
religious freedom. Thus, even though Abdul Rauf claims that 
the non-Muslim citizen has a full religious freedom (Abdul Rauf 
1988, 45–51), as far as that procedure is not stated clearly and 
explicitly in the constitution, according to Gamwell, there is no 
religious freedom. 
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As stated in section two, in the democratic discourse, the 
formal claim about justice which is constituted in the constitu-
tional procedure is primary. This is why Gamwell believes that 
religious freedom as modern political problems is nothing other 
than a constitutional matter (Gamwell 1995, 37). Because the 
democratic resolution to the modern political problems empha-
sizes primarily on the constitutional procedure, consequently 
defining religious freedom and its ramifications such as the right 
to express and to manifest the religious conviction, the rights to 
sit in the Shura (Consultative Body) and the rights to sit in any 
political position cannot be dependent only on a given religious 
conviction. Thus, even though, for instance, the Muslims con-
stitute the majority, the concept of religious freedom must be 
defined by the Muslims and the non-Muslims as well. Also, this 
concept must be written clearly and explicitly in the constitution 
and must get the affirmation of the whole adherents of different 
religious convictions in order to fulfill the formal claim about 
justice (Fox 2008).
Even though in the democratic discourse, the formal claims 
about justice or the constitutional procedure is primary, this does 
not mean that the material claim about justice which is con-
stituted in every decision can be neglected. Human reason and 
experience, however, will judge whether the decision produced 
through the overriding constitutional procedure is just or not. In 
other words, the human reason and experience shall be the crite-
ria in order to measure the material claims about justice. On this 
account, the treatment of an Islamic State, as well as the concept 
of religious freedom offered by Abdul Rauf, is, of course, very 
convincing and beautiful (Abdul Rauf 1988, 45–51). Whoever 
reads these concepts will come to a conclusion that the Islamic 
State does fulfill the material claim about justice. 
However, for Gamwell, no matter how convincing and 
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beautiful these concepts are, there would be no religious free-
dom insofar as there is no full and free debate. This full and 
free debate can, of course, be done if only there is a procedural 
guarantee which is clearly and explicitly stated in a constitu-
tional procedure. Thus, the guarantee of material claims about 
justice as described by Abdul Rauf will be meaningless unless it 
is accompanied by the procedural guarantee. In the democrat-
ic discourse, to repeat what I have stated, fulfilling the formal 
claim about justice is more important than fulfilling the material 
claim about justice. 
The last feature is that the Islamic State must have a deep 
commitment to the dictates of sharia (Abdul Rauf 1988, 38). 
Again, in the democratic discourse, the state is proscribed to 
“support the teaching of any religion or answer to the com-
prehensive question”(Gamwell 1995, 167, 186). This does not 
mean that the state prohibits the adherents of Islam from having 
a deep commitment to the sharia. In the democratic discourse, 
sharia, which constitutes the answer to the comprehensive ques-
tion, is essential to the Muslims. What is not in line with the 
democratic discourse is the explicit endorsement of the state to 
the sharia. Thus, the allegiance of the state to a given religious 
conviction and regards it as the state’s explicit answer to the 
comprehensive question is unjustifiable (Gamwell 1995, 205).
In practice, the state might accept the capital punishment 
from the sharia, say Islam, but might reject its principle of rela-
tive polygamy. Instead, the state might accept the idea of abso-
lute monogamy believed by the Christian. Or, after being free-
ly and fully debated through a just and affirmed constitutional 
procedure, the Shariah might become personal and criminal law. 
But, if the state accepts the sharia as the criminal and personal 
law, it is simply because the body politic agrees on it, not be-
cause of the desire of the state to co-opt Islamic ideas and make 
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it as the answer to the comprehensive question. The political ac-
tivity, however, is not intended to ask and answer explicitly the 
comprehensive question. Thus, as far as the criminal and per-
sonal law which is derived from the sharia is stipulated through 
an affirmed constitutional procedure, there is no reason for the 
other religious adherents not to obey these laws insofar as both 
laws are not against human reason and experience. 
In the debate, let us say parliamentary debate, every religious 
adherent free to refer to their comprehensive understanding or 
religious convictions. The Muslims are allowed to refer to their 
sharia, similarly, the Christians are allowed to refer to their ca-
nonical book as a reference, the Buddhists are justifiable to base 
their argument on Tri Pitaka and the a-theist groups can use 
their personal truth to buttress their argument. In brief, every re-
ligious adherent of a religious conviction is free to use his or her 
religious conviction as a reference as well as the basis for argu-
ment (Gill 2007). This is different from the idea of free-standing 
justice of John Rawls which requires justification only from the 
ideas that are implicit in the political culture (Rawls 2005, 10). 
Hence, no religious conviction is important to politics. Religious 
conviction should be left behind when we play in the political 
arena. 
Even though the sharia has been the main element of the 
state’s political activities, the state must maintain its neutrality 
toward the sharia. The state cannot claim the sharia to be its 
comprehensive understanding of the comprehensive question. 
When the sharia has been the main element of the state’s politi-
cal activity, its function changes. The sharia which was formerly 
regarded as the answer to the comprehensive question now has 
been the state’s political activity. Because the political activity is 
not intended to provide the answer to the comprehensive ques-
tion, whatever the decision derived from the sharia must not be 
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addressed to answer the comprehensive question. 
From the above explanation, its clear that Gamwellian ap-
proach on religious freedom requires the neutrality of the state 
to support explicitly to a given religious conviction, including 
the sharia. In view of this, the question emerges, can a state be 
named “Islamic State” without mentioning explicitly about its 
commitment to the sharia as that proposed by Abdul Rauf? If 
the answer is “no”, there would be no full and free debate, and, 
without full and free debate, there would be no democratic dis-
course, and, the absence of the democratic discourse means the 
absence religious freedom.
Conclusion
Gamwell believes that religious freedom is nothing other 
than a political discourse that can figure out only through a 
democratic resolution. According to the democratic resolution, 
it is justifiable to bring a given religious conviction into the po-
litical arena because it is the religious conviction that provides 
the answer to the comprehensive question, and it is the answer 
to the comprehensive question that the authenticity of a human 
being can be found. Because the authenticity of a human being 
cannot be fragmented, it is necessary that the religious convic-
tion is involved in the political arena. As a result, the religious 
conviction should be ready to be freely and fully debated. This is 
what Gamwell means with “religion as rational.”
Changing paradigm from “religion as non-rational” to “re-
ligion as rational” is a necessary condition for entering a public 
debate. Yet, the sole public debate or public view is not enough 
to solve the modern political problems. The public debate must 
be guided by a constitutional procedure affirmed by the body 
politic so that it fulfills the criteria of formal claim about jus-
tice. So important is the affirmed constitutional procedure in 
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the democratic discourse that Gamwell believes that religious 
freedom is nothing other than constitutional matter. 
Because the modern political problem of religious freedom is 
a constitutional matter, the idea of establishing the Islamic State 
proposed by Abdul Rauf elicits at least four important questions. 
First, can a state be named “Islamic State” without mentioning 
the word “Islamic” in its constitution? Second, can a state be 
named “Islamic State” without mentioning explicitly the words 
“sovereignty belongs to Allah” in its constitution? Third, Can 
a state be named “Islamic State” without mentioning explicitly 
about its commitment to sharia in its constitution? Fourth, can a 
state be named “Islamic State” whose constitution states explic-
itly that all adherents of different religious convictions have the 
equal opportunity and rights for any political position, includ-
ing the position of the head of the state? If the answer of these 
four question is “yes”, it means that there is religious freedom. 
On the contrary, if the answer is “no”, it means that there is no 
religious freedom. 
Another logical consequence of the dictum that “religious 
freedom is constitutional matter” is that the affirmation of the 
whole body politic is of a great significance to determine wheth-
er or not a given constitutional procedure is just. Since the “affir-
mation” of the body politic is a determinant, the formulation of 
the constitutional procedure related to religious freedom cannot 
be formulated only by the Muslims, even if they are the major-
ity. This formulation requires the involvement of the body poli-
tic without regard to their different religious conviction. This is 
why, even though Abdul Rauf claims that, in an Islamic State, 
the non-Muslims will have a just treatment and will have the 
rights to religious freedom, it will be meaningless unless these 
guarantees are explicitly stated in the constitution.
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